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 OPINION 
                      
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 This civil rights action was filed with the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a state prisoner who alleges that 
he was beaten by numerous prison guards in the aftermath of a 
prison riot.  The prison guards appeal the jury verdict and entry 
of judgment in favor of the plaintiff.  We are called on to 
determine whether the district court: (1) abused its discretion 
in limiting the scope of cross-examination of a witness for the 
plaintiff; (2) abused its discretion in instructing the jury on 
the law governing the use of force against prisoners; and (3) 
erred by permitting the jury to render a special verdict on an 
issue which had not originally been submitted to them. 
 Because we conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion by improperly limiting the scope of cross-examination 
of a key witness for the plaintiff, we will reverse the judgment 
of the district court and remand for a new trial.  In light of 
our decision to remand for a new trial, it is not necessary to 
  
address the issue of the jury instruction regarding the law 
governing the use of force against prisoners.  Nonetheless, 
because of the likelihood that this issue will undoubtedly arise 
again during the new trial, we will give directions on the issue 
to the district court.  Finally, as to the special verdict issue, 
we conclude that the district court erred in allowing the jury to 
consider whether a prison guard approved an excessive use of 
force when the only theory of liability submitted to the jury was 
that the prison guard actually participated in the beating.    
     
 I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 Defendants in the district court and appellants before 
us are four prison guards from the State Correctional Institution 
at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Camp Hill").1  Andre Douglas 
("Douglas"), plaintiff in the district court, was an inmate at 
the same institution and alleges that he was beaten on two 
separate occasions by prison guards in the immediate aftermath of 
riots which occurred in October of 1989 at SCI-Camp Hill.  
 Douglas filed two complaints which alleged that 
appellants and seven others, all prison guards or prison 
officials, violated his constitutional rights when they beat him, 
observed others beat him, and failed to protect him.  Summary 
                     
1
.  The four defendants/appellants are Ronald Griffith 
("Griffith"), Christopher Simoncini ("Simoncini"), Jose Luis 
Enriquez ("Enriquez"), and Carl Ardabell("Ardabell").  For 
purposes of this appeal we will refer to them collectively as 
"appellants" or "prison guards" unless it is necessary to 
distinguish among them. 
  
judgment was granted in favor of two defendants.  The case 
against the remaining defendants, including appellants, was tried 
before a jury. 
 Testimony at trial elicited that on October 25 and 26, 
1989, riots broke out at SCI-Camp Hill.  Prior to and during the 
riots, Douglas was confined in the Restricted Housing Unit 
("RHU"), also known as "D block," within the prison.  During the 
riots, the security of RHU had been compromised, requiring a 
thorough search or "shakedown" of the RHU, which was conducted on 
October 31, 1989.  Douglas claimed that he was twice beaten 
without cause by corrections officers:  once on October 31 after 
the shakedown and once on November 3, immediately before he was 
transferred to the federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, 
Pennsylvania.2  Douglas claims that during the October 31 
incident, he was handcuffed and then beaten with a baton in his 
cell, dragged out of his cell, beaten again, and then threatened 
with a shotgun. 
 Defendants attempted to show that Douglas was never 
beaten by offering the following evidence:  (1) all of the 
defendants denied beating Douglas; (2) members of the 
Pennsylvania State Police who patrolled SCI-Camp Hill during the 
riots and were on duty during the alleged beating testified that 
Douglas had not been beaten; (3) although medical records at the 
                     
2
.  Because none of the appellants were implicated in the alleged 
beating that occurred on November 3, 1989, any testimony or 
evidence relating to that day is not relevant for purposes of 
this appeal. 
  
prison indicate that Douglas complained of and was treated for 
chest pain following the riots, the medical records did not note 
any bruises or contusions that Douglas claims were present on his 
chest; and (4) a videotape of Douglas taken upon his arrival at 
Lewisburg shows no visible injuries to his head or face.  
Additionally, when asked by correction officials in the videotape 
if he had any injuries, Douglas answered that he did not. 
 Douglas attempted to corroborate his claim with 
testimony from the Imam Quadir Sabir ("the Imam")3, who at the 
time was an Islamic chaplain at SCI-Camp Hill.  The Imam 
testified that at some point between October 25 and November 3, 
1989, he observed that Douglas had "abrasions or bruises in the 
chest area and around the neck area."  App. at 73.  On cross-
examination of the Imam, appellants attempted to establish that 
the Imam had been fired by the Department of Corrections because 
of his involvement with the rioting inmates at SCI-Camp Hill and 
his failure to cooperate in an investigation of the riots.  The 
district court, however, refused to permit this line of 
questioning on cross-examination and instead only allowed the 
jury to learn that the Imam's employment had been "terminated."4   
                     
3
.  An "Imam" is a prayer leader of Islam, a Moslem scholar, or 
an authority on Islamic law. 
4
.  The cross-examination of the Imam was conducted by defense 
counsel Stoner as follows: 
 
 Q. You used to be an employe[e] of the Department of  
 Corrections; isn't that correct? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
  
(..continued) 
 Q. You are no longer an employe[e] of the Department of  
 Corrections; are you? 
 
 A. No. 
 
 Q. In fact, you were an employe[e] -- 
 
 Ms. Wiggins (counsel for Douglas):  Objection, Your Honor,  
        relevance. 
 
 Ms. Stoner:  It goes to bias and motive, Your Honor. 
 
 Ms. Wiggins:  May we approach? 
   
 The Court:  Yes. 
 
  (The following discussion was had at sidebar:) 
 
 Ms. Stoner:  Your Honor, he was terminated by the   
    Department, and therefore it goes to his bias       
and motive to speak against these officers.  In       
fact, he was terminated because of his alleged       
involvement with the inmates in this riot, and       
his failure to cooperate in an investigation of       
the riots. 
 
 The Court:  I am not going to let you get into the reasons  
    of the termination.  You can bring out the fact  
    that he was terminated. 
 
 Ms. Stoner:  That he was fired by the Department, and in  
     fact was barred from any federal or any state - 
 
 The Court:  No.  He was terminated.  That gives you enough   
     of a bias.  You don't have to get into the  
    reasons for his termination.  We would be trying  
    a case within a case. 
 
 Ms. Wiggins:  The ruling is that she may not say that he was 
       fired? 
 
 The Court:  That he was terminated. 
 
 Ms. Stoner:  Your Honor, he was fired. 
 
 The Court:  He was terminated.  That is the way it is going 
     to be. 
 
 Ms. Stoner:  I would note my objection for the record. 
  
 At the conclusion of his case, Douglas voluntarily 
dismissed one defendant.  In addition the district court granted 
another defendant's motion to dismiss.  The jury returned special 
verdicts finding that appellants Simoncini, Enriquez, and 
Ardabell had used excessive force against Douglas and that 
appellant Griffith had approved the use of excessive force.  The 
jury awarded Douglas a total of $10,000 in compensatory and 
punitive damages.5 
(..continued) 
 
 The Court:  You have an exception. 
 
  (End of discussion at sidebar.) 
 
 By Ms. Stoner: 
 
 Q. Mr. Sabir, wasn't your employment with the Department  
 of Corrections terminated by the Department after the  
 riot? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Ms. Stoner:  I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
 
App. at 80-82. 
5
.  The damages were allocated as follows: 
 
DEFENDANT COMPENSATORY PUNITIVE TOTAL 
    
Simoncini $ 500 $ 1000 $ 1500 
Griffith   500   1000   1500 
Enriquez   500   1000   1500 
Ardabell  1500   4000   5500 
    
TOTAL $ 3000 $ 7000 $10,000 
App. at 305-06. 
  
 Appellants argue that the district court improperly 
limited their scope of cross-examination of the Imam.  Next, 
appellants take issue with the district court's refusal to 
instruct the jury that not all force used against a prisoner is 
excessive.  They argue that had the jury been informed that 
prison guards may lawfully use reasonable physical force when 
necessary in the prison setting, the jury may have concluded that 
such force was justified under the circumstances.  Finally, 
appellants claim that it was improper for the district court to 
allow the jury to impose liability on Griffith for approving the 
use of excessive force, when throughout the litigation and in the 
charge to the jury Douglas only claimed that Griffith used 
excessive force. 
 
 II. Discussion 
 A.  Scope of Cross-Examination 
 We review a district court's ruling concerning the 
allowable scope of cross-examination for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 117 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 
United States v. Reed, 724 F.2d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 1984)), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1092, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992). 
 We begin our analysis by noting that a party is 
guaranteed "only `an opportunity for effective cross-examination, 
not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish.'"  Kentucky v. Stincer, 
482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1987) (quoting Delaware 
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294 (1985)) 
  
(emphasis in original).  We also recognize that the district 
court is required to strike a balance between the opportunity to 
cross-examine and the need to prevent repetitive or abusive 
cross-examination.  United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 919 
(3d Cir. 1991).  Thus, the district court may properly exercise 
its discretion in this area by imposing reasonable limits on the 
scope of cross-examination, weighing such factors as undue 
prejudice, relevancy, and delay due to repetition.  As stated 
recently by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
"[t]rial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits 
on cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, 
confusion of the issues or interrogation that is repetitive or 
only marginally relevant."  United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 
17 F.3d 1354, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 To properly evaluate a witness, a jury must have 
sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of a 
witness's motives and bias.  See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 
45, 52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469 (1984).  It is an abuse of discretion 
for a district judge to cut off cross-examination if the 
opportunity to present this information is not afforded.  See 
Harbor Ins. Co. v. Schnabel Foundation Co., 946 F.2d 930, 935 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (district court abused its discretion in cutting 
off cross-examination because it was not collateral, irrelevant, 
or prejudicial and had a direct bearing on the weight to be given 
  
the witness' testimony by the jury), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 
112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992).6  
                     
6
.  Much of the current authority pertaining to the permissible 
scope and limitation of cross-examination involves cases of a 
criminal nature.  See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51-
52, 107 S. Ct. 989, 998 (1987) ("[T]he right to cross-examination 
includes the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or 
that the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable."); Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986) 
("[T]he exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a 
proper and important function of . . . cross-examination."); 
United States v. Ovalle-Marquez, 36 F.3d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(trial court abuses its discretion on cross-examination "if the 
jury is left without sufficient information concerning formative 
events to make a discriminating appraisal of a witness's motives 
and bias") (citations and internal quotation omitted), cert. 
denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 947 (1995); United States v. 
Carty, 993 F.2d 1005, 1010 (1st Cir. 1993) (the district court 
may not limit cross-examination unless the jury possesses 
sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of the 
possible biases and motivations of the witness); United States v. 
Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 806 (2d Cir. 1990) (cross-
examination is not improperly limited if the jury possesses 
"facts sufficient to make a discriminating appraisal of the 
particular witness's credibility") (citation and internal 
quotation omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S. Ct. 1397 
(1991); United States v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 
1993) (the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-
examination because the jury received adequate information with 
which to evaluate the bias, credibility, and vindictive 
proclivities of the witness), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. 
Ct. 735 (1994); United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th 
Cir. 1981) ("The exposure of possible motivations for false 
testimony is a fundamental element of cross-examination . . . .  
Thus, cross-examination into any motivation or incentive a 
witness may have for falsifying his testimony must be 
permitted."); United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 213 (6th 
Cir. 1986) (the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
limiting the scope of cross-examination because the aggressive 
attacks on the witness' credibility by counsel put the jury in 
possession of sufficient information by which to appraise the 
witness' credibility); United States v. Nelson, 39 F.3d 705, 708 
(7th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen reviewing the adequacy of cross-
examination, the question is whether the jury had sufficient 
information to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness's 
motives and bias.") (citation and internal quotation omitted) 
(bracket in original); United States v. Durman, 30 F.3d 803, 811 
  
 
 As related above, appellants were only permitted to 
elicit from the Imam that he was "terminated" from his position 
after the riots.  We conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion in not allowing appellants the opportunity to question 
the Imam with regard to the circumstances surrounding his 
discharge.  The word "terminated" and even the word "fired" is 
not sufficient to effectively portray to the jury any alleged 
bias, lack of credibility, and motives of the Imam.  The Imam 
could have been terminated or fired for any number of "neutral" 
(..continued) 
(7th Cir. 1994) (no abuse of discretion because counsel was able 
to cross-examine the witness extensively and had the opportunity 
to probe credibility and bias), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. 
Ct. 921 (1995); United States v. Warren, 18 F.3d 602, 603 (8th 
Cir.) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
permit cross-examination on a particular topic because counsel 
had an opportunity to vigorously cross-examine witness about 
related matters), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 652 
(1994); United States v. Dees, 34 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(because counsel was able to elicit substantial information from 
the witness relating to her biases, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by further limiting cross-examination); 
United States v. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 614 (10th Cir. 
1987) ("[C]ross-examination of a witness regarding specific 
instances of conduct which are probative to show any incentive a 
witness may have to falsify his testimony is also proper."); 
United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1541 (11th Cir. 1994) (no 
abuse of discretion in limiting cross-examination because no 
further bias would have been exposed by further questioning), 
cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 952 (1995). 
 
 While cross-examination in the criminal context assumes 
a heightened importance because of the constitutional 
implications inherent in confronting one's accuser pursuant to 
the Sixth Amendment, similar concerns -- the jury must have 
sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of the 
witness's motives and bias -- are implicated in a civil trial 
context as well.  
  
reasons which would not suggest to the jury that he was biased in 
favor of Douglas and against appellants.7  Without further 
inquiry, the jury did not have sufficient information with which 
to make a discriminating appraisal of the Imam's motives or bias. 
 In addition, the jury may have felt that a member of 
the clergy is impartial and tells the truth.  Our concern that 
the jury may have given unhesitating credence to the testimony of 
the Imam, a religious figure, is heightened by the fact that the 
only claim on which the jury found in favor of Douglas was the 
claim in which his testimony was corroborated by the Imam.8 
    In order to effectively cross-examine the Imam, the 
appellants must be in a position to reveal that the Imam may be 
both biased against appellants and biased in favor of prisoners, 
such as Douglas.9  In order to accomplish this, appellants must 
                     
7
.  We can speculate as to any number of reasons including: (1) a 
budget deficit which required that his position be eliminated; 
(2) a transfer to another correctional institution and a refusal 
on his part to move or commute there; (3) the ending of a 
provisional term of employment; (4) the lack of Islamic prisoners 
at that prison; (5) the prisoners desire to have another Imam; or 
(6) a host of other reasons having nothing to do with the prison 
riot.    
8
.  Indeed, we note that where the only testimony for the 
plaintiff was the testimony of Douglas himself, the jury returned 
a verdict in favor of the appellants. 
9
.  Appellants have suggested two possible methods of achieving 
this goal: (1) allow a limited cross-examination whereby the 
appellants set forth only the facts of the Imam's discharge; or 
(2) allow an extensive cross-examination and provide the jury 
with a limiting instruction which explains that the purpose of 
the cross-examination was simply to reveal the bias of the 
witness.  Without intruding unnecessarily into what properly 
remains the domain of the district court, we note that either of 
these methods would be a suitable technique if, as a consequence, 
  
at a minimum be in a position to attempt to elicit from the Imam 
that: (1) he exhibits some bias against appellants because he was 
fired from his position at the prison due to alleged misconduct 
on his part; and (2) he exhibits some bias in favor of prisoners 
like Douglas as revealed by his refusal to participate in the 
investigation.10  Because we conclude that the district court 
unduly limited the scope of cross-examination, we will remand 
this matter to the district court for a new trial.11 
 
 B.  Jury Instruction on the Use of Excessive Force 
 We must next decide whether the district court erred in 
instructing the jury on the law governing the proper use of force 
(..continued) 
the jury receives adequate information with which to evaluate the 
bias and credibility of the Imam.  
10
.  We intimate no view as to whether the evidence of the Imam's 
alleged involvement with the rioting inmates or his failure to 
cooperate in the investigation of the riot would be a specific 
instance of conduct which could not be proved by extrinsic 
evidence except as otherwise provided in Rule 608(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
11
.  We are further troubled by the absence in the record of any 
evidentiary ruling by the district court whereby this highly 
relevant evidence was excluded.  Douglas argues that the district 
court implicitly performed a Rule 403 (Federal Rules of Evidence) 
balancing analysis and concluded that the evidence should be 
excluded.  However, assuming arguendo that a Rule 403 balancing 
was undertaken, we would be hard-pressed to hold that this 
extremely relevant and probative evidence of the Imam's alleged 
bias was "outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  Additionally, we are 
unwilling to abdicate our appellate function and defer to the 
district court when such evidentiary rulings have not been made 
part of the record before us. 
  
against prisoners.  "We review a district court's rulings on 
points for the jury charge for abuse of discretion."  Waldorf v. 
Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 740 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).  At 
trial, counsel for Douglas and counsel for appellants presented 
the jury with two mutually exclusive and inconsistent theories 
concerning the beatings which allegedly occurred.  Douglas argued 
before the jury that he was beaten without provocation by prison 
guards.  Appellants defended on the theory that the alleged 
beatings never occurred and, thus, they could not have possibly 
participated in such conduct.  Nevertheless, appellants also 
requested the district court to charge the jury on the proper and 
reasonable use of force in a prison setting.12 
  The district court rejected the proposed jury 
instruction offered by appellants, and in its place used its own 
charge regarding the use of excessive force in a prison 
                     
12
.  Specifically, appellants asked the district court for the 
following charge: 
 
 Not all force, push, or shove used by a prison official 
should be considered excessive.  Prison officials may use force 
against inmates as a security measure to resolve a disturbance 
that poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and staff.  
The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security 
measure, therefore, doe[s] not amount to cruel and unusual 
punishment even if in retrospect it appears that the amount of 
force used or authorized turned out to be unnecessary in a strict 
sense.  So, if you find that the defendants authorized use of 
force in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 
i.e., to make sure that institution was secure, then you must 
return a verdict in favor of the defendants.   
 
Douglas v. Owens, No. 89-1879, slip op. at 5 (M.D.Pa. May 31, 
1994).  
  
context.13  Appellants argue that the charge given by the 
district court is inadequate because it fails to convey the 
notion that "force is not constitutionally `excessive' just 
because it turns out to have been unnecessary in hindsight."  
Appellants' Brief at 16 (emphasis in original). 
                     
13
.  The district court charged the jury as follows: 
 
 The United States Constitution protects persons from 
being subjected to excessive force.  In other words, prison 
officials may employ only the amount of force necessary under the 
circumstances. 
 . . .  
 In considering the degree of force a reasonable prison 
official will use, you may consider such factors as the need for 
the application of force, the relationship between the need and 
the amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury 
inflicted, whether force was applied in a good faith effort to 
maintain and restore discipline or maliciously or sadistically 
for the very purpose of causing harm, the extent of the threat to 
the safety of staff and inmates as reasonably perceived by 
responsible officials [and] any efforts made to temper the 
severity of a forceful response. 
 In order to prevail on his claim, plaintiff must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants were 
actually in his cellblock, and that they used physical force 
against him, and that the force was applied maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm to the 
plaintiff.  To do something maliciously means to desire to harm a 
person or to see a person suffer harm.  To do something 
sadistically means to inflict pain on the person for one's own 
pleasure. 
 The United States Constitution protects persons from 
being subjected to excessive force.  Prison officials may not act 
with deliberate indifference to the safety of prisoners. 
 . . .  
 To prevail in this claim, plaintiff must prove that 
those defendants were actually in the RHU and that they saw 
excessive force being applied against the plaintiff maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing plaintiff harm 
and that they were in a position to stop it, but that they did 
not. 
 
App. at 271-73 (emphasis supplied). 
  
 Contrary to the position espoused by appellants, the 
jury instruction adequately insulated appellants from liability 
if the jury concluded that they used excessive force, even if it 
is later determined to have been unnecessary.  If "force was 
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline,"  App. at 272 (emphasis supplied), the jury 
presumably would conclude that although the use of force was 
excessive, it was still justified given the circumstances.  
Further, the jury was instructed that it could believe a version 
of the events other than that presented by Douglas or appellants 
-- a version whereby appellants used force against Douglas, but 
it was not excessive, or that it was excessive, but nonetheless 
appeared justified under the circumstances.  App. at 268.  A jury 
verdict that force was justifiably used against Douglas and such 
force as was used was reasonable under the circumstances was not 
in accord with the contentions of any of the parties to this 
litigation, but the jury could reasonably come to such a 
conclusion by accepting some of the evidence offered by each 
party. 
 A party is entitled to a jury instruction that 
accurately and fairly sets forth the current status of the law.  
See McPhee v. Reichel, 461 F.2d 947, 950 (3d Cir. 1972) ("It is 
the responsibility of the trial judge to provide the jury with a 
clear and accurate statement of the law . . . ."); Resolution 
Trust Corp. v. Eason, 17 F.3d 1126, 1132 (8th Cir. 1994) (as long 
as entire charge fairly and adequately contains law applicable to 
case, judgment will not be disturbed on appeal); Harrison v. Otis 
  
Elevator Co., 935 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1991) (trial court has 
broad discretion to compose jury instructions, as long as they 
are fundamentally accurate and not misleading).  No litigant has 
a right to a jury instruction of its choice, or precisely in the 
manner and words of its own preference.  See Heller Int'l Corp. 
v. Sharp, 974 F.2d 850, 860 (7th Cir. 1992) (district court has 
substantial discretion with respect to specific wording of jury 
instructions and need not give proposed instruction if essential 
points are covered by those that are given); Anderson v. Branen, 
17 F.3d 552, 559-60 (2d Cir. 1994) (litigant is entitled to 
instruction that correctly reflects applicable law and 
sufficiently covers essential issues, but party is not entitled 
to prescribe exact language of that charge).  We conclude that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the 
proposed jury instruction offered by appellants.  The charge of 
the district court was proper and adequate under the facts of 
this case. 
 
 C.  Special Verdict 
 The judge presented the jury with special verdict 
questions to decide the liability issues at the time of trial.  
The first question asked whether certain prison guards, including 
appellant Griffith, "used force" against Douglas.  App. at 310.  
The second question asked whether certain prison guards (other 
than Griffith) "approved of the use of force" against Douglas.  
App. at 311 (emphasis added). 
  
 During the course of jury deliberations, the jury sent 
a note to the judge asking if they could move Griffith from 
question one to question two -- that is, the jurors wished to 
consider whether Griffith had "approved of the use of force" 
rather than consider if Griffith had actually himself "used 
force."  Apparently, the jurors did not think that Griffith 
himself had used force, but rather they believed that he had 
tacitly approved the use of force by failing to stop the other 
prison guards who were actually using improper or unreasonable 
force.  The district court held that it would be proper for the 
jury to modify the special verdict form and decide whether 
Griffith was liable for being present during the assault and 
failing to intervene. 
 Appellant Griffith argues that the questions submitted 
to the jury were special verdict questions, and thus Rule 49(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied in 
reviewing the propriety of allowing the jury to modify the 
special verdict questions.14  He maintains that when special 
                     
14
.  Rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
relevant part: 
 
 The court shall give to the jury such 
explanation and instruction concerning the 
matter thus submitted as may be necessary to 
enable the jury to make its findings upon 
each issue.  If in so doing the court omits 
any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or 
by the evidence, each party waives the right 
to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted 
unless before the jury retires the party 
demands its submission to the jury.  As to an 
issue omitted without such demand the court 
may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, 
  
verdict questions are submitted, if "the court omits any issue of 
fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party 
waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted 
unless before the jury retires the party demands its submission 
to the jury."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).  Griffith contends that 
Douglas waived any right to recover against him on a claim of 
"approving of the use of force" because Douglas failed to object 
when Griffith's name was not included on question two of the 
special verdict form at the time it was submitted to the jury. 
 Douglas argues that Griffith errs in characterizing the 
claim before the jury as "using force."  Douglas interprets the 
claim more broadly and construes it generally as "excessive force 
in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights."  Appellee's Brief 
at 16.  In this way, Douglas maintains that "using force" or 
"approving the use of force" were both properly before the jury 
since it is just as much a violation of Douglas' constitutional 
rights for Griffith to observe and approve his beating as it is 
for Griffith to physically beat Douglas.  Additionally, Douglas 
contends that the court did not omit any issue of fact or 
evidence in submitting the special verdict questions to the jury, 
because the issue was in evidence by virtue of Douglas' testimony 
during cross-examination.15 
(..continued) 
it shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accord with the judgment on the special 
verdict. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
15
.  See infra note 16. 
  
 The approaches adopted by both parties are flawed and 
fail to address a more fundamental concern -- that is, Griffith 
was never on notice of any claim that he failed to intervene 
while others improperly used force against Douglas.  Admittedly, 
during the course of cross-examination, Douglas himself suggested 
to the jury that Griffith either actually beat him or was present 
during the beatings, and approved the use of force against him.16  
However, although testimony elicited from Douglas during cross-
examination may have indicated to the jury that Griffith was 
present, but did not participate in the unauthorized use of 
force, it appears that Douglas never: (1) included this theory in 
his pleadings; (2) advanced this theory to the jury while 
presenting his case-in-chief; (3) argued this theory to the jury 
in his closing arguments; or (4) asked that this alternative 
theory of liability be included in the special verdict questions. 
                     
16
.  The cross-examination of Douglas proceeded as follows: 
 
 Q. You are saying for sure Officer Ardabell, Enriquez,  
 Simoncini and Griffith all beat you; is that correct? 
 
 A. Officer Griffith, he was there.  I don't recall him  
 striking any blows.  But without a doubt, Officer  
 Enriquez, Ardabell and Simoncini were -- definitely  
 struck me. 
 
 Q. So Sergeant Griffith then didn't hit you.  So you are  
 changing your story now; is that correct? 
 
 A. I believe that he hit -- he struck me.  But it happened 
  so fast, there were barrages of punches and kicks, some 
  of which I wasn't able to see at the time.  But I am  
 inclined to believe he struck me. 
 
App. at 69-70. 
  
 The more reasoned and principled approach is to 
construe the jury question and the colloquy which ensued as an 
attempt by Douglas to modify the pleadings to conform to the 
evidence.  We believe that Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure contemplates exactly such a situation where a 
plaintiff attempts to have a claim presented to the jury for 
consideration even though that claim was not present in the 
pleadings.17  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b).18  
 After the jury sent back a question asking if it could 
move Griffith from question one to question two on the special 
verdict sheet, Griffith argued vehemently that this was a new 
                     
17
.  Here, however, in a highly unusual situation, it was not the 
plaintiff, but rather the jury who implicitly wanted this claim 
to be added to the complaint.  Nonetheless, once raised by the 
jury, Douglas essentially argued that the pleadings should be 
amended to conform to the evidence at trial. 
 
18
.  Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.  Such 
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made 
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but 
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues.  If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, 
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so 
freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice the 
party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon the 
merits.  The court may grant a continuance to enable the 
objecting party to meet such evidence. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). 
  
claim never before presented at trial.19  Despite the lack of a 
                     
19
.  The discussion of the jury question proceeded as follows: 
 
 Ms. Stoner:  The plaintiff's claim was always [- -] in his  
     complaint, in everything he ever presented [-   
    -] that Griffith participated in the beating. 
      . . . 
 
 Ms. Stoner:  [P]laintiff's claim was always that Captain  
     Griffith beat him.  It was never that he       
watched.  Therefore, this is a new claim that       
has been raised against Griffith.  It was never       
raised in any complaint or any pleading in this       
action. 
 
 The Court:  That is what I am going to do.  If I don't let  
    them do it and I find that I am wrong, I have   
   got a new trial facing me.  If I let them do it   
   and I find that I am wrong, I can in post-trial   
   motions correct the problem.  I think that is      
the only choice I have until we have enough time      to 
research it. 
     . . . 
  
 Ms. Stoner:  [M]y objection is as stated, it is a new claim 
      against Captain Griffith never raised before. 
      . . . 
 
 Ms. Stoner:  I guess my question is you have now permitted  
     another claim against Captain Griffith.  They   
    have a finding.  I just don't understand how       
that works.  How could we ever raise a question       
about that and get judgment NOV? 
 
 The Court:  By saying that if I have permitted another claim 
     and it is wrong, if I am legally wrong in this, 
     it would appear to me you could get judgment  
    NOV. 
     . . .  
 
 The Court:  I have the complaint here.  But my concern is  
    that the jury could very easily determine maybe  
    from the evidence that he didn't beat anybody,   
   but that he was present and other people did.  I   
   don't know whether that makes it a new claim or   
   it compromises a claim. 
 
App. at 292-95. 
  
formal motion by Douglas to amend the pleadings, the district 
court effectively permitted Douglas to amend the pleadings and 
include a claim against Griffith for approving the use of force.  
  We review for abuse of discretion the district court's 
granting of leave to amend the complaint.  Berger v. Edgewater 
Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 920, 111 S. Ct. 1310 (1991). 
 Although the claim that Griffith approved the use of 
force was not raised in the pleadings, Rule 15(b) permits 
pleadings to be amended if the claim was tried by the express or 
implied consent of the parties.  "[I]f the issue . . . has not 
been tried with the consent of the parties, then an amendment to 
conform to the pleadings will not be permitted no matter when 
made.  6A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1494, at 53 (1990) (emphasis added).  Clearly, the 
record does not support a finding of express consent by Griffith. 
 We must next address whether this issue was tried with 
the implied consent of Griffith.  As noted by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, a finding that an issue was tried 
by implied consent depends on: 
 whether the parties recognized that the 
unpleaded issue entered the case at trial, 
whether the evidence that supports the 
unpleaded issue was introduced at trial 
without objection, and whether a finding of 
trial by consent prejudiced the opposing 
party's opportunity to respond. 
Portis v. First Nat'l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(quoting United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 312-13 (5th Cir. 
  
1994)); see Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 34 
F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff must show that defendant 
understood that evidence had been used to prove the new issue and 
that the new issue had been directly addressed and not 
inferentially raised by incidental evidence); Yellow Freight Sys. 
v. Martin, 954 F.2d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 1992) (same). 
 We observe that not only did Griffith not object to the 
introduction of the evidence as to the claim of approving the use 
of force, but it was Griffith who opened the door to this 
evidence while cross-examining Douglas.  Nevertheless, an issue 
has not been tried by implied consent if evidence relevant to the 
new claim is also relevant to the claim originally pled, because 
the defendant does not have any notice that the implied claim was 
being tried.  Gamma-10 Plastics v. American President Lines, 32 
F.3d 1244, 1256 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, __ S. 
Ct. __, 63 U.S.L.W. 3641 (Feb. 27, 1995) (No. 94-1188); see 
Portis, 34 F.3d at 332 (if evidence of a pleaded issue and an 
unpleaded issue overlaps, there is no implied consent absent a 
clear indication that the party using the evidence is attempting 
to raise a new issue); Acequia, 34 F.2d at 814 (same); Yellow 
Freight, 954 F.2d at 358 (evidence that is relevant to a pleaded 
issue as well as an unpleaded issue does not give fair notice to 
the opposing party that the unpleaded issue is entering the 
case). 
 Although the testimony elicited from Douglas arguably 
was evidence relevant to whether Griffith approved the use of 
force, the testimony was also relevant to whether Griffith 
  
actually used force.  Douglas' uncertainty as to whether Griffith 
used force against him pointed to the weakness in Douglas' 
pleaded claim (that Griffith actually used force).  Regardless of 
who introduced the evidence at trial, Douglas bore the burden of 
notifying defense counsel that he intended to use this evidence 
to prove an additional claim.  Because Griffith was not on notice 
that Douglas wished to argue an additional claim at trial, 
Griffith cannot be said to have impliedly consented to an 
amendment of the pleadings.20  Finally, it is obvious that 
Griffith was severely prejudiced at such a late stage in the 
proceedings when the district court effectively permitted Douglas 
to amend the pleadings and allowed the jury to consider another 
theory of liability against Griffith without Griffith having had 
the opportunity to defend against this new claim.   
 Because Douglas failed to assert his claim in a timely 
manner and this failure prejudiced Griffith, judgment as a matter 
of law must be granted against Douglas and in favor of Griffith 
on the belated claim that Griffith "approved of the use of 
force."21    
                     
20
.  It is contrary to the record for Douglas to even suggest 
that he was attempting to prove this additional claim at trial.  
As mentioned previously, it appears that Douglas never: (1) 
advanced this theory to the jury while presenting his case-in-
chief; (2) argued this theory after the evidence was elicited 
during cross-examination; (3) argued this theory to the jury in 
his closing arguments; or (4) asked that this alternative theory 
of liability be included in the special verdict questions.  In 
fact, we are confident that had the jury never sent a question to 
the court, this additional theory of liability would never have 
been pursued by Douglas. 
21
.  The only claim properly asserted at trial and preserved for 
jury consideration against Griffith is that he personally used 
  
 
  III. Conclusion 
 We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand for a new trial because the district court abused its 
discretion by improperly limiting the scope of cross-examination 
of a key witness for the plaintiff.  We affirm the ruling of the 
district court which rejected the appellant's proposed jury 
charge.  The charge of the district court adequately set forth 
the law governing the appropriate use of force against prisoners.  
Finally, as to the special verdict issue, we conclude that the 
district court erred in allowing the jury to render a verdict 
finding appellant Griffith liable for approving the use of 
excessive force, when the only theory of liability tried before 
the court and submitted to the jury was that Griffith actually 
participated in an improper beating.  We will direct the district 
court to enter judgment in favor of Griffith on the claim against 
him.    
(..continued) 
excessive force against Douglas.  As to that claim, the district 
court concluded that, "[t]he testimony admittedly does not 
support the allegation that defendant Griffith actually beat 
Plaintiff."  Douglas v. Owens, No. 89-1879, slip op. at 2.  We 
agree that judgment as a matter of law was properly granted 
against Douglas and in favor of Griffith on Douglas' claim that 
Griffith used excessive force against him.  Although we have 
earlier concluded that a new trial is warranted due to the 
improper limitation on the scope of cross-examination, appellant 
Griffith will be dismissed, since the jury did not return a 
verdict against him on the only theory of liability that was 
properly presented for its consideration.  Douglas may proceed 
with a new trial against Simoncini, Enriquez, and Ardabell.  
Douglas v. Owens, No. 94-7406    
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 I believe the issue in this case is very close.  
Nonetheless, I dissent because I would, in cases such as this, 
give greater deference to the discretion exercised by the 
district court, than appellant would have us give.  To do 
otherwise further obscures the already-blurred line demarcating 
the boundary between the plenary and abuse of discretion 
standards of review.  I consider reversing the district court's 
decision here to be the antithesis of the holding the majority 
cites that: 
 [t]rial judges retain wide latitude to impose 
reasonable limits on cross-examination based 
on concerns about, among other things, 
confusion of the issues or interrogation that 
is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 
 
United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1370-71 (11th 
Cir. 1994).  I conclude that the trial judge acted within her 
sound discretion, and would affirm. 
 What the appellant invites us to perform here is 
essentially a plenary review of a discretionary decision that 
simply cannot and, moreover, should not be reviewed de novo.  The 
myriad of twists and turns in a trial, the shifting biases as 
evidence comes before the factfinder, and the entire personality 
and flavor of a trial cannot be adequately conveyed in the cold 
record we review on appeal.   Hence, we have standardized review 
  
to grant the district courts "wide latitude" to limit cross-
examination, and to make numerous other evidentiary decisions, 
subject only to a review for whether they abused that discretion.  
Not from any argument given us by the appellant, nor by any 
definition of the word, can I consider "abuse" an appropriate 
label for the district court's discretion on this singular 
judgment call. 
 At sidebar, appellant's counsel argued to the district 
court that she be permitted to reveal to the jury that "[Sabir] 
was terminated by the department. ..."  That is precisely what 
the court allowed her to do.22  In her argument to the district 
court, counsel mentioned, without citing any source of proof, 
that  "[Sabir] was terminated" for "alleged involvement with the 
rioting inmates."  Nonetheless, she did not persist on this 
point, and I deduce from the substance of the sidebar that the 
real argument was whether the word "fired" or "terminated" more 
accurately describes how Sabir was separated from the chaplaincy.  
(See Maj. typescript at 6, n.4).  Moreover, I consider the subtle 
differences between the use of the word "terminated" and the use 
of the word "fired" to be the type of evidentiary "fine tuning" 
that is unbecoming when done by appellate judges, who review the 
evidence in a vacuum relieved only by a printed record.  Either 
                     
22
.  The attorneys had earlier agreed that plaintiff's counsel 
would not elicit from a correction officer/witness the reason why 
she was discharged because they considered this evidence to be 
irrelevant. 
  
word implies that he did not leave voluntarily.  I reject 
appellant's argument on this issue. 
 Next, even if I were to conclude that this decision by 
the district court was an abuse of its discretion, I believe the 
error is harmless.  Indeed, the testimony the Imam offered, even 
when taken in the light most favorable to appellee, is the 
following: 
 1.  that the plaintiff was "in a shameful manner,"  
A73; 
 2.  that Douglas "said he was being harassed by the 
officers," A74; 
 3.  that Douglas was naked in his cell and "had 
abrasions or bruises in the chest area and around the neck area,"  
and "was sick with a cold," A74-75; 
 4.  that Lieutenant Spells "said to me that the 
atmosphere, that there was nothing he could really do in 
reference to getting medication because of the atmosphere in the 
prison ... his hands was [sic] tied.  And even if he wanted to do 
something, he couldn't do it," A76-77; 
 5.  the testimony most damaging to the defendants was 
Sabir's nonresponsive conclusion that the bruises "signalled to 
me that he had been beaten."  To this appellant objected, but 
then did not even follow with a request that the Imam's statement 
be stricken.   
  
 The gravamen of Douglas' complaint is that a number of 
correctional officer defendants "did in fact, acting under the 
color and authority of Pennsylvania state law, beat, stumped 
[sic] and kicked plaintiff Andre Douglas in the head, arms, back 
and legs while plaintiff was handcuffed and naked," and that 
other officers during this beating "did not make an attempt to 
stop them."  A20-21.  Hence, what is at issue is whether some 
defendants beat Douglas, while others stood idly by.  The 
defendants flatly denied the allegations.  On that point, when 
asked if he saw "any of these defendants assault Mr. Douglas," 
Sabir answered, "No, I can honestly say no."  A80. 
 Finally, defendants' reason for wanting this line of 
inquiry before the jury was ostensibly to discredit the witness 
by attempting to show bias.  This argument also fails.  A 
significant point we recognize, as the district court no doubt 
did, but which the appellant conveniently elides, is that Sabir 
was not terminated by the defendants.  Indeed, they were co-
employees of the same facility.  Nor was it shown, offered or 
even suggested that Sabir harbored some bias towards the 
defendants -- if indeed he harbored any at all.  In sum, the 
whole line of inquiry was simply irrelevant to what was at issue 
in the trial.  
 I conclude that the district court committed no 
reversible error.  The most critical testimony Sabir offered was 
that plaintiff was beaten; and this, although nonresponsive and 
  
improper, was not requested to be stricken.  Whether the witness 
was biased against his former employer is not relevant to these 
defendants and whether the jury believed Sabir's testimony is not 
relevant to the issue of who beat Douglas.  On that critical 
point, Sabir's testimony was as favorable to the defendants as to 
the plaintiff.  Finally, as the district court concluded, and 
with which I concur, permitting the defense to explore the 
reasons only "alleged" for Sabir's termination, and then the 
plaintiff to engage in the rehabilitative explanations which were 
destined to follow, was likely to create the distracting "trial 
within a trial" which tends to confuse jurors, obfuscate the real 
issues, and which courts laudably seek to prevent.  I find no 
abuse in the court's discretionary decisions.  I would affirm. 
  
 
